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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 New Jersey’s Affidavit of Merit Statute (the “AOM 
Statute” or simply “Statute”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A 26-
29, requires certain claims against professionals to include an 
affidavit from an independent professional attesting to the 
claims’ merit.  We decide whether the AOM Statute covers 
Nuveen Municipal Trust’s action seeking money damages for 
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and malpractice, allegedly 
committed by two professional firms.  Though typically we 
conceive such statutes as applying only to malpractice claims 
rooted in negligence resulting from harm to a known 
property, New Jersey courts go further, making our answer 
yes.  
I. Background 
 This case stems from a loan transaction between 
Appellant Nuveen Municipal Trust (“Nuveen”), on behalf of 
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its Nuveen High Yield Municipal Bond Fund, and Bayonne 
Medical Center (“Bayonne”).  On October 11, 2006, Nuveen 
purchased a $10 million Bond Anticipation Note (“BAN”) 
from Bayonne.  In connection with the transaction, Bayonne 
provided Nuveen with an audit report authored by Bayonne’s 
accounting firm, WithumSmith+Brown, P.C. (“Withum”), 
and an opinion letter authored by Bayonne’s counsel, 
Lindabury, McCormick, Estabrook & Cooper P.C. 
(“Lindabury”).  Soon after the transaction, Bayonne filed a 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.  Nuveen contends that the 
audit report and opinion letter concealed aspects of 
Bayonne’s financial condition and, had it known about these 
financial issues, it would not have purchased the BAN.   
 Nuveen filed this action against Withum and 
Lindabury (collectively, “Appellees”).  It asserts negligent 
misrepresentation and fraud as to Withum and negligent 
misrepresentation and malpractice as to Lindabury; the 
remedy it seeks throughout is money damages.  The District 
Court dismissed the action with prejudice based on Nuveen’s 
failure to file an affidavit of merit complying with the AOM 
Statute. 
 After initially remanding the case to the District Court 
on a jurisdictional issue, we issued an opinion in August 2012 
– Nuveen Mun. Trust ex rel. Nuveen High Yield Mun. Bond 
Fund v. Withumsmith Brown, P.C., 692 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 
2012).  In it we held, inter alia, that the District Court was 
correct in not affording Nuveen certain procedural protections 
with respect to the AOM Statute.  Additionally, we stated that 
“[i]f the AOM Statute applies to the action, we believe that 
Nuveen’s noncompliance with it calls for the action’s 
dismissal.”  Id. at 288.  We questioned, however, whether the 
action was subject to the Statute and thus reserved deciding 
whether the District Court was correct to dismiss the action 
with prejudice.  Instead, we certified the following two 
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questions of law regarding the Statute to the New Jersey 
Supreme Court.   
o Whether the nature of the injury alleged in this 
case, i.e., the loss of money expended to 
purchase the BAN from Bayonne, falls within 
the AOM [Statute’s] coverage of “any action 
for damages for personal injuries, wrongful 
death or property damage.”  Specifically, is 
Nuveen seeking recovery in this action for 
“property damage” as that term is used in N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-27? 
 
o Whether an action alleging an intentional tort, 
such as common law fraud or aiding and 
abetting common law fraud, which relates to 
alleged professional malpractice or negligence 
but does not require proof of malpractice or 
negligence, is subject to N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2A:53A-27? 
Judge Aldisert dissented in part from our decision, contending 
that no certification was necessary, as the New Jersey 
Supreme Court has been adequately clear on the points in 
question.  In his view, Nuveen’s action was subject to the 
AOM Statute and, consequently, had been correctly 
dismissed.   
 In 2013, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied our 
petition for certification. Shortly thereafter, Appellees filed a 
supplemental brief addressing additional New Jersey state law 
and renewing their argument that an AOM was required in 
this case and that we should affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of the complaint.   
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 In this follow-up opinion we address what we did not 
in our August  2012 opinion – essentially, whether the AOM 
Statute applies to Nuveen’s action.  In light of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s denial of our petition for certification, we 
decide the question based on our best understanding of how 
the New Jersey Supreme Court would rule.  See Sheridan v. 
NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 253-54 (3d Cir. 2010) (A 
federal court sitting in diversity is “bound to follow state law 
as announced by the highest state court”; if the state’s highest 
court has not decided the question, we “must predict the 
position the court would take on [the] issue” and should look 
to decisions by intermediate appellate state courts) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  We conclude that 
because Nuveen’s action (1) can be characterized as one 
seeking recovery for property damage and (2) requires proof 
of Appellees’ deviation from professional standards of care, 
the AOM Statute applies and the action was properly 
dismissed under New Jersey law.  
II. Discussion 
 The AOM Statute provides that an affidavit of merit is 
required in actions seeking “damages for personal injuries, 
wrongful death or property damage resulting from an alleged 
act of malpractice or negligence by a licensed person in his 
profession or occupation.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-27.  The 
“overall purpose of the statute is to require plaintiffs in 
malpractice cases to make a threshold showing that their 
claim is meritorious, in order that meritless lawsuits readily 
could be identified at an early stage of litigation.”  Couri v. 
Gardner, 801 A.2d 1134, 1137 (N.J. 2002) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  Couri, the seminal New Jersey 
case on the AOM Statute, sets out the following framework 
for analyzing whether the Statute applies to a particular claim: 
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(1) whether the action is for “damages for 
personal injuries, wrongful death or property 
damage” (nature of injury); (2) whether the 
action is for “malpractice or negligence” (cause 
of action); and (3) whether the “care, skill or 
knowledge  exercised or exhibited in the 
treatment, practice or work that is the subject of 
the complaint [] fell outside acceptable 
professional or occupational standards or 
treatment practices” (standard of care).  
 
Id. at 1137 (alteration in original) (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2A:53A-27).  The parties do not dispute that the complaint 
satisfies element (3).  We only consider, therefore, whether 
Nuveen’s allegations satisfy elements (1) and (2).  
Nature of Injury 
 Element (1) requires us to address whether the money 
damages sought by Nuveen in connection with its loan 
transaction with Bayonne qualify as a claim for “property 
damage” required by the Statute.  Nuveen, relying on Couri, 
contends that it seeks only compensatory damages and related 
costs and, as such, is not asserting a claim for “property 
damage.” See id. at 1138.  The plaintiff there filed a 
complaint against his psychiatrist for breach of contract and 
breach of fiduciary duty resulting from the psychiatrist’s 
distribution of a preliminary report to the estranged wife of 
the plaintiff without his knowledge or consent.  Id. at 1136.  
The plaintiff initially requested “compensatory and punitive 
damages” but later narrowed his request to the $12,000 he 
had already paid the psychiatrist for the report and associated 
costs.  Id. at 1138.  The latter moved to dismiss, arguing that 
the claim was for malpractice and that the plaintiff had not 
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filed the requisite affidavit of merit.  The Court rejected this 
argument, holding that because the damages sought were not 
“damages for personal injuries, wrongful death or property 
damage,” plaintiff’s claim did not satisfy the first element of 
the Statute and no affidavit of merit was required.  Id.   
 Unlike the plaintiff in Couri, Nuveen is not seeking to 
recoup money it has already paid to Appellees.  In fact, it has 
never directly dealt with Appellees.  Instead, it seeks 
unspecified money damages stemming from its loan 
transaction with non-party Bayonne.   
 Contrary to Nuveen’s contentions, case law from 
lower New Jersey courts comports with Couri and supports 
the conclusion that the monetary recovery sought by Nuveen 
is of the type that triggers the AOM Statute.  Cornblatt v. 
Barow, 696 A.2d 65 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997), rev’d 
on other grounds by 708 A.2d 218 (N.J. 1998), for example, 
squarely addressed the issue of whether a “claim that [a 
party’s] alleged malpractice resulted in money damages was 
contemplated by the Legislature as a claim for ‘property 
damage’ under the [AOM] statute.”  Id. at 68.  There the 
Court held that 
[m]alpractice or negligence committed by 
architects, engineers, or attorneys may very well 
result in damage to real and personal property.  
Personal property  embraces everything that 
may be tangible or intangible such as a chose in 
action. The right or claim to money 
damages . . . is a property right . . . beyond 
question.  Accordingly, we conclude that a 
claim against an attorney for alleged 
malpractice  is a claim for property damage 
within the legislative intent and plain meaning 
of the statute.  
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Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).    
 Similarly, in Nagim v. N.J. Transit, 848 A.2d 61 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law. Div. 2003), the plaintiff sued for property 
damage against New Jersey Transit (“Transit”), which in turn 
filed a third-party complaint for contractual indemnification 
against an engineering services company (“Urbitran”) whose 
project design allegedly caused the underlying damage to the 
plaintiff’s property.  The Court dismissed New Jersey 
Transit’s complaint against Urbitran for failure to file an 
affidavit of merit, noting that “jurisprudence under the [AOM 
Statute] has conclusively recognized that the ‘property 
damage’ language of the statute includes a claim for money 
damages,” and holding that Transit’s claim against Urbitran 
implicated “both intangible and tangible property rights.”  Id. 
at 70.  It specifically distinguished the case from Couri on the 
ground that “[t]here, the plaintiff’s initial claim for 
compensatory and punitive damages was narrowed and 
limited solely to . . .  compensatory damage . . . .  That injury 
thus became a finite sum of money already paid by the 
plaintiff to the defendant and for which recompense was 
sought.”  Id. at 70-71.  In Nagim, by contrast, Transit sought 
to assert a cause of action against a third-party, Urbitran, “not 
for any monies already paid by Transit to Urbitran for 
services provided . . .  [but] for the actual defense and/or the 
yet unspecified defense costs associated with plaintiff’s 
claims against Transit.” Id. at 71.  This, the Court held, was a 
claim for property damage within the meaning of the AOM 
Statute.  Id.  Like the relevant party in Nagim and unlike the 
plaintiff in Couri, Nuveen is not seeking to recover a sum 
certain already paid to Appellees, but rather asks for damages 
relating to its transaction with Bayonne.  See SRC Constr. 
Corp. of Monroe v. Atlantic City Hous. Auth., No. 10-3461, 
2011 WL 1375680, at *3-4 (D.N.J. Apr. 12, 2011) 
(considering both Couri and Nagim and concluding that 
plaintiff’s claims were for “property damage” under the AOM 
11 
 
Statute, as they “[did] not seek to recoup a finite sum already 
paid to [defendants]” but rather sought unspecified monetary 
damages).   
 If any doubt remains that negligence or malpractice 
actions for unspecified money damages meet the property 
damage requirement of the AOM Statute, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court has, post-Couri, stated generally that “[t]he 
[S]tatute applies to all actions for damages based on 
professional malpractice.”  Paragon Contractors, Inc. v. 
Peachtree Condo. Ass’n, 997 A.2d 982, 985 (2010).  
Although Paragon’s ultimate holding turned on the time 
limits for filing an affidavit of merit and so did not directly or 
extensively address the applicability of the AOM Statute, the 
Court’s broad statement that the AOM Statute applies to all 
actions for damages based on professional malpractice has 
not been questioned by any other New Jersey court decision.  
Thus we conclude that Nuveen has brought an action for 
property damage under the AOM Statute.      
Cause of Action 
 Nuveen asserts claims of fraud, aiding and abetting 
fraud, and negligent misrepresentation against Withum, along 
with claims of malpractice and negligent misrepresentation 
against Lindabury.  Nuveen concedes that the AOM Statute 
applies to its negligence and malpractice claims against both 
Appellees.  It argues, however, that its claims for common 
law fraud, and aiding and abetting common law fraud, against 
Withum are intentional tort claims to which the AOM Statute 
does not apply.   
 The problem for Nuveen is that in New Jersey an 
action need not be styled as one for malpractice or negligence 
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for the AOM Statute to apply.  Rather, in Couri
1
 the New 
Jersey Supreme Court explained that 
[i]t is not the label placed on the action that is 
pivotal but the nature of the legal  inquiry. 
Accordingly, when presented with a tort or 
contract claim asserted against a professional 
specified in the statute, rather than focusing on 
whether the claim is denominated as tort or 
contract, attorneys and courts should determine 
if the claim’s underlying factual allegations 
require proof of a deviation from the 
professional standard of care applicable to that 
specific profession.  If such proof  is required, 
an affidavit of merit is required for that claim, 
unless some exception applies. 
801 A.2d at 1141.  Applying this standard to the case before 
it, the Couri Court held that no AOM was required. 
Plaintiff is not claiming that defendant erred in 
respect of the conclusions that he  drew 
concerning psychiatric/medical matters or that 
defendant acted improperly from a 
psychiatric/medical standpoint . . . . Instead, the 
crux of plaintiff’s complaint is that defendant 
acted improperly as an expert witness by 
                                              
1
 Though the New Jersey Supreme Court in Couri 
acknowledged it could conclude its opinion on the first 
element of the statute – the “nature of the injury” – alone, it 
continued to analyze the second element of the statute – the 
“cause of action”  – in order to resolve conflicts and provide 
future guidance to lower courts.  801 A.2d at 1138.   
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disseminating the report to others without the 
knowledge or consent of plaintiff.  Although 
defendant’s unauthorized dissemination of the 
report also might implicate a deviation from 
prevailing professional standards of practice, 
proof of that deviation is not essential to the 
establishment of plaintiff’s right to recover 
based on breach of contract. 
  
Id. at 1142.   
 To determine whether an affidavit of merit was 
required in our case, we examine the evidence needed to 
prove the fraud allegations in Nuveen’s complaint.   Those 
claims against Withum are premised on the theory that it 
made material misrepresentations and omissions of past and 
present facts in its audit report.  For example, Nuveen alleges 
that Withum in its audit report, inter alia, allowed Bayonne to 
count a conditional or unenforceable pledge as revenue, failed 
to ensure that Bayonne had adequately reserved for 
uncollectible accounts receivable, and failed to evaluate 
adequately Bayonne’s ability to continue as a going concern.  
These misrepresentations and omissions are alleged to be a 
direct consequence of Withum completing its audit 
examination and report of Bayonne in a manner that violated 
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (“GAAS”) and 
Generally Accepted Auditing Principles (“GAAP”).  The 
complaint does not allege that Withum made any material 
misrepresentations other than those resulting from the failure 
to comply with GAAS and GAAP.   
 Though Nuveen’s allegations of fraud against Withum 
are styled as intentional torts, rather than negligence or 
malpractice claims, they nonetheless require proof that 
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Withum deviated from professional standards of care.    And 
New Jersey Courts, following what they perceive to be the 
path set out by the State Supreme Court in Couri, stretch 
“malpractice or negligence” to include even those instances.  
See, e.g., Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C., v. 
Quinn, 983 A.2d 604, 621-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2009) (requiring affidavit of merit in breach-of-contract claim 
against attorney because pleadings alleged that “the quality of 
work product was not sufficient,” and that the attorney “failed 
to do a complete and competent job”; those allegations 
required “proof of a deviation from the professional standard 
of care applicable to attorneys”); Charles A. Manganaro 
Consulting Eng’rs., Inc. v. Carneys Point Twp. Sewerage 
Auth., 781 A.2d 1116, 1119 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) 
(affidavit of merit required in breach-of-contract claim 
against engineer when “the essential factual allegations . . . 
[were] that [the engineer] failed to properly prepare the plans 
and specifications”; this is an “allegation[] of professional 
malpractice – that [he] failed to act with that degree of care, 
knowledge, and skill ordinarily possessed and exercised in 
similar situations by the average member of the profession 
practicing in the field” (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted)).   
 Though this is counterintuitive (one may argue 
illogical), it is the suit we must follow; while intentional torts 
are by definition not negligent, the focus is deviation from a 
professional standard devoid of any claim label.  Hence the 




 Based on our understanding of the New Jersey courts’ 
view of the AOM Statute’s applicability, we conclude that the 
money damages sought by Nuveen are considered a claim for 
“property damage” and that the underlying factual allegations 
of Nuveen’s fraud claims against Withum require proof of a 
deviation from the professional standard of care.  
Accordingly, the District Court correctly held that the AOM 
Statute applies and that Nuveen’s noncompliance with the 
Statute warranted dismissal of its case. 
 For these reasons, we affirm.  
